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Closing the Gap: DACA, DAPA, 
and U.S. Compliance with 
International Human Rights Law 
David B. Thronson* 
Political rhetoric and ongoing litigation that challenge the 
use of prosecutorial discretion and deferred action in 
immigration law often prominently feature claims that these 
initiatives demonstrate a lack of respect for the rule of law.  
This short essay seeks to highlight gaps between U.S. 
immigration law and its international human rights obligations 
and identify ways in which the use of discretion can advance 
rather than undermine the rule of law.  In reconciling the ability 
of States to control matters of immigration with protections of 
family integrity, the touchstone in international law is balance.  
A State’s right to expel a non-citizen resident for a legitimate 
state interest must be balanced against due consideration in 
deportation proceedings for a deportee’s family connections and 
the hardship the deportation may have on the family, especially 
children.  The non-citizen’s right to remain is not absolute, but 
neither is the State’s right to expel.  U.S. immigration law’s 
routine failure to provide any opportunity for decision makers to 
balance family equities against the need for enforcement violates 
international human rights law’s demand for contextualization 
and nuance in the application of immigration controls.  DACA 
and DAPA are flawed yet important mechanisms to permit the 
United States to inject respect for the rule of law into an 
otherwise rigid immigration system.  Where decision makers are 
able to consider equitable factors in determining whether to 
proceed with immigration enforcement or exercise discretion, 
the United States moves a bit closer to compliance with its 
international human rights law obligations.  
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I. Introduction 
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced 
its Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative.1 
Pursuant to this program, DHS articulated criteria under which 
certain noncitizens without lawful immigration status who had arrived 
in the United States as children could seek deferred action. Regarding 
the individuals eligible for prosecutorial discretion under DACA, in 
announcing this policy Secretary Napolitano noted:  
Our Nation’s immigration laws must be enforced in a strong and 
sensible manner. They are not designed to be blindly enforced 
without consideration given to the individual circumstances of 
each case. Nor are they designed to remove productive young 
people to countries where they may not have lived or even 
speak the language. Indeed, many of these young people have 
already contributed to our country in significant ways. 
Prosecutorial discretion, which is used in so many other areas, is 
especially justified here.2  
She further stated that DACA was “necessary to ensure that our 
enforcement resources are not expended on these low priority cases 
but are instead appropriately focused on people who meet our 
enforcement priorities.”3 
Two years later, DHS expanded DACA and announced a similar 
initiative, Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful 
Permanent Residents (DAPA), to allow certain undocumented 
parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents to seek 
deferred action.4 In announcing this extension of DACA, Secretary 
 
1. Memorandum of Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Security, 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion With Respect to Individuals Who 
Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012) (on file at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H3BQ-MCET]). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Memorandum of Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion With Respect to Individuals Who 
Came to the United States as Children and With Respect to Certain 
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Johnson noted, “Due to limited resources, DHS and its Components 
cannot respond to all immigration violations or remove all persons 
illegally in the United States. As is true of virtually every other law 
enforcement agency, DHS must exercise prosecutorial discretion in the 
enforcement of the law.”5 Parents of U.S. citizen and lawful 
permanent resident children who are otherwise not enforcement 
priorities, Johnson we went on to say, generally: 
[A]re hard-working people who have become integrated members 
of American society. Provided they do not commit serious 
crimes or otherwise become enforcement priorities, these people 
are extremely unlikely to be deported given this Department’s 
limited enforcement resources—which must continue to be 
focused on those who represent threats to national security, 
public safety, and border security.6 
Political rhetoric and ongoing litigation that challenge both 
DACA and DAPA have prominently featured claims that these 
initiatives represent executive power grabs and demonstrate a lack of 
respect for the rule of law.7 Others have persuasively rebutted such 
allegations through analysis of the strong legal authority and 
historical precedent for the use of prosecutorial discretion and 
deferred action8 and by demonstrating how DACA and DAPA 
actually are “anchored in rule of law values, including consistency, 
 
Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent 
Residents (Nov. 20, 2014) (on file 
athttp://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo
_deferred_action.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8JH-5PUJ]; see also 
Memorandum from Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the 
President, The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to 
Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United 
States and to Defer Removal of Others (Nov. 19, 2014) (on file at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/20
14/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CL2A-K7HK]). 
5. Sources cited supra note 4. 
6. Sources cited supra note 4. 
7. See Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, 
and the Rule of Law Basis for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 
UCLA L. Rev. Disc. 58, 62-63 (2015). 
8. The Unconstitutionality of Obama’s Executive Actions on Immigration, 
Hearing Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. at 30 
(2015) (written statement of Stephen Legomsky) (concluding that, 
“[l]ike the overwhelming majority of other immigration law professors 
and scholars . . . I believe that the legal authority for both the 
Prosecutorial Discretion Memo and the DACA/DAPA Memo is clear).  
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transparency, accountability, and nonarbitrariness.”9 This short essay 
will not rehearse these arguments but rather will seek to introduce 
another consideration into the discussion by identifying ways in which 
DACA and DAPA can be responsive to instances in which the 
enforcement of U.S. immigration law defies the nation’s obligations 
under international human rights law. As means to partially reconcile 
U.S. law with international law, DACA and DAPA advance rather 
than undermine the rule of law.   
II. Immigration and Protections for Families in 
International Human Rights Law 
International human rights law instruments loudly articulate the 
central importance of family. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights declares that the “family is the natural and fundamental group 
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the 
State.”10 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the American Convention on Human Rights echo this language.11 
Articles V and VI of the American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties provide that every person has “the right to the protection of 
the law against abusive attacks upon his . . . private and family life” 
and “the right to establish a family, the basic element of society, and 
to receive protection thereof.”12 Article VII of the American 
Declaration provides that “all children have the right to special 
protection, care and aid” and Article IX provides that “every person 
has the right to the inviolability of his home.”13 Indeed, the 
importance of family is set forth in virtually all major international 
human rights instruments.14 
 
9. Kalhan, supra note 7, at 66. 
10. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 at art. 16(3) (1948). 
11. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 23(1), opened 
for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 
23, 1976, adopted by the U.S. Sept. 8, 1992) (“The family is the natural 
and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the State.”); American Convention on Human Rights art. 
17(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M 673 (1970) (“The family is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the state”). 
12. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art. XXVI, 
O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted May 2, 1948, available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.american%20Declarati
on.htm [perma.cc/R4YM-SWD2]. 
13. Id. 
14. See, e.g., African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 
18(a), June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) (“The family shall be the 
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Although the word “family” is not mentioned in the U.S. 
Constitution, the importance of protecting families is as firmly 
entrenched in U.S. law as it is internationally, at least outside the 
context of immigration. As the Supreme Court notes, “the interests of 
parents in the care, custody and control of their children . . . is 
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by 
the Court.”15 In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court recognized:  
[T]he right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the 
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to 
enjoy these privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.16  
The Court further emphasized the special protection afforded the 
relationship between parents and children in Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters when it noted that “[t]he child is not the mere creation of the 
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations.”17 The Court occasionally is in disagreement 
regarding the constitutional rationale for extending protection to the 
parent-child relationship, but there is no ambiguity in the Court’s 
affirmation of limits on interference regarding this relationship.18 
 
natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State 
which shall take care of its physical health and moral.”); European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 8, Nov 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Dec. 
3, 1953) (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life . . .”); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Social Rights 
art. 10(1), Dec. 16, 1966, GA Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (“The widest 
possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, 
which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society…”). 
15. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); see generally Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
16. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
17. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
18. See e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57 (“[A]t least eight justices affirmed that 
the Constitution protects the parent-child relationship from undue 
governmental interference, although a majority of justices could not 
agree on a rationale for the decision.”); see generally Shani M. King, 
U.S. Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of 
Family: Toward a Functional Definition of Family That Protects 
Children’s Fundamental Human Rights, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 
509, 515 (2010). 
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As I have discussed at length elsewhere, there is “tremendous 
potential for inconsistency as immigration law and family law 
intersect. The vindication of immigration law goals often results in 
the compromise of family integrity, and achievement of family 
integrity often can be accomplished only in violation of immigration 
laws.”19 In many instances, the enforcement of U.S. immigration law:  
[C]reates searing family narratives of separation, hardship, and 
trauma, yet immigration law ignores these compelling stories 
and renders them legally irrelevant. Removal proceedings 
provide no opportunity or framework to hear the voices of those 
most directly and deeply affected by the enforcement of 
immigration law. By narrowing what is relevant, deportation is 
accomplished without having to confront the reality evidenced 
by the voices and narratives of immigrant families. Things that 
matter deeply—family separation, hardship and trauma—are 
swept aside.20 
This failure to engage with the realities of deportation for families 
and children is a principal reason that U.S. immigration law is at 
odds with international human rights law. 
In reconciling the ability of states to control matters of entrance 
and residence with protections of family integrity, the touchstone in 
international law is balance. For example, in Stewart v. Canada the 
U.N. Human Right Committee noted that, under international law, a 
State’s right to expel a non-citizen resident for a legitimate state 
interest must be balanced against due consideration in deportation 
proceedings for a deportee’s family connections and the hardship the 
deportation may have on the family.21 The European Court of Human 
Rights struck a similar balance:  
It is for the Contracting States to maintain public order, in 
particular by exercising their right, as a matter of well-
established international law and subject to their treaty 
obligations, to control the entry and residence of aliens and 
notably to order the expulsion of aliens convicted of criminal 
offences. However, their decisions in this field must, in so far as 
they may interfere with a right protected under paragraph 1 of 
Article 8 (art. 8-1) [right to private and family life], be 
 
19. David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-
Child Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1165 (2006). 
20. David B. Thronson, Unhappy Families: The Failings of Immigration 
Law for Families That Are Not All Alike, in THE NEW DEPORTATIONS 
DELIRIUM: INTERDISCIPLINARY RESPONSES (Daniel Kanstroom & M. 
Brinton Lykes, eds., NYU Press 2015). 
21. Stewart v. Canada, Comm. No. 538/1993, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., ¶ 
12.10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 (Dec. 16, 1996). 
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necessary in a democratic society, that is to say, justified by a 
pressing social need and proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.22  
The individual’s right to remain is not absolute, but neither is the 
State’s right to expel.23 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has 
noted that in striking the balance between control of immigration and 
family, the European Court and the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
have “considered a variety of elements in balancing a deportee’s rights 
to remain in a host country and a state’s interest to protect its 
citizenry and other individuals under its jurisdiction.”24 These 
elements include: the age at which the non-citizen immigrated to the 
host State; the non-citizen’s length of residence in the host State; the 
non-citizen’s family ties in the host State; the extent of hardship the 
non-citizen’s deportation poses for the family in the host State; the 
extent of the non-citizen’s links to the country of origin; the non-
citizen’s ability to speak the principal language(s) of the country of 
origin; and the nature and severity of any criminal offenses committed 
by the non-citizen. In analyzing a claim that U.S. immigration law 
violated protections for family and children under the American 
Declaration, the IACHR noted that “[b]oth the Inter-American 
Commission and the European Court have recognized that under 
international law the best interest of a deportee’s citizen children 
must be duly considered in any removal proceeding.”25 
As the IACHR articulated in their 2000 report, U.S. immigration 
law’s routine failure to provide an opportunity for decision makers to 
balance family equities against the need for enforcement violates 
 
22. C. v. Belgium, No. 35, 541 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627 at ¶ 31, No. 
35/1995/541/627 (June 24, 1996); see also Beldjoudi v. France, No. 
12083, Eur. Ct. H.R. 86 at ¶ 74 (Judgment of March 26, 1992). 
23. Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz et al. v. United States, Case 12.562, 
Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., Report No. 81/10, ¶ 58 (2010) (“[T]he 
European Court and the U.N. Human Right Committee’s decisions in 
this area demonstrate that a deportee’s establishment of a family or 
private ties to a host country does not establish an immutable right of a 
non-citizen to remain in the host country. . . . The Commission finds 
that a balancing test is the only mechanism to reach a fair decision 
between the competing individual human rights and the needs asserted 
by the State.”). 
24. Id. at ¶ 54. 
25. Id. at ¶ 57 (July 12, 2010); see also Andrea Mortlock v. United States, 
Case 12.534, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 63/08, ¶ 78 (July 25, 
2008) (“[I]mmigration policy must guarantee to all an individual 
decision with the guarantees of due process: it must respect the right to 
life, physical and mental integrity, family, and the right of children to 
obtain special means of protection.”). 
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international human rights law’s demand for contextualization and 
nuance in the application of immigration controls:  
Given the nature of Articles V, VI and VII of the American 
Declaration…where decision-making involves the potential 
separation of a family, the resulting interference with family life 
may only be justified where necessary to meet a pressing need 
to protect public order, and where the means are proportional 
to that end. The application of these criteria by various human 
rights supervisory bodies indicate that this balancing must be 
made on a case by case basis, and that the reasons justifying 
interference with family life must be very serious indeed.26 
Where persons deported from the United States “had no 
opportunity to present a humanitarian defense to deportation or to 
have their rights to family duly considered before deportation,” the 
IACHR found the United States in violation of “rights under Articles 
V, VI, and VII of the American Declaration by failing to hear their 
humanitarian defense and duly consider their right to family and the 
best interest of their children on an individualized basis in their 
removal proceedings.”27 The Commission clarified and emphasized 
that “removal proceedings for non-citizens must take due 
consideration of the best interest of the non-citizens’ children and a 
deportee’s rights to family, in accordance with international law.”28 
After finding the United States in violation of international 
human rights law, the IACHR recommended remedial actions in the 
individual case including “a competent, independent immigration 
judge to apply a balancing test to . . . individual cases that duly 
considers their humanitarian defenses and can provide meaningful 
relief and that the United States “[i]mplement laws to ensure that 
non-citizen residents’ right to family life, as protected under Articles 
V, VI, and VII of the American Declaration, are duly protected and 
given due process on a case-by-case basis in U.S. immigration removal 
proceedings.”29 Subsequently, the Commission found that the United 
States “has not taken measures toward compliance with the 
recommendations in the merits report in this case.30 
 
26. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report on the Situation of Human Rights of 
Asylum Seekers Within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 70 rev. ¶ 166 (2000). 
27. Smith et al. v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 81/10, ¶¶ 59-60 (July 12, 2010). 
28. Id. at ¶ 57. 
29. Id. at ¶ 67. 
30. Id. at ¶ 71; see also Hugo Armendariz v. United States, Case 526-03, 
Report No. 57/06, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127 Doc. 4 rev. 
1, ¶ 30 (2007), available at 
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III. DACA, DAPA, and International Law 
The laundry list of considerations used by international tribunals 
has much in common with the guidelines for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion under DACA and DAPA. DACA criteria 
include age of arrival in the United States, residence and ties to this 
country, and review of any criminal activity.31  Similarly, DAPA 
criteria include residence and ties to the United States, consideration 
of criminal activity, and the presence of children.32 Certainly, cut-off 
dates and rigid barriers to eligibility for DACA and DAPA based on 
past criminal activity mean that not all will have a balancing of 
equitable factors conducted by competent, independent immigration 
judges as the Commission recommended. But even the baseline 
opportunity that decision makers consider equitable factors in 
determining whether to proceed with immigration enforcement or 
exercise discretion to at least temporarily forego removal moves the 
United States a bit closer to compliance with international human 
rights law.  
Choices are inevitable in determining where scarce enforcement 
resources will be utilized. “Congress knows that there are about 11 
million undocumented immigrants living in the U.S., and it knows 
that the resources it is appropriating enable the Administration to go 
after fewer than 400,000 of them per year, less than 4% of that 
population.”33 In such a situation, the choice to establish enforcement 
priorities that improve the United States’ compliance with its 
international human rights law obligations in no way demonstrates a 
lack of respect for the rule of law. Honoring the rule of law 
encompasses much more than unthinking application of inequitable 
laws. It requires “proportionality, procedural fairness, and the 
rejection of Draconian ‘one size fits all’ solutions to complex social 
problems.”34 DACA and DAPA are flawed yet important mechanisms 
 
cidh.org/annualrep/2006eng/USA526.03eng.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VD54-TCE3] (“According to the long-standing 
practice and jurisprudence of the inter-American human rights system . 
. . the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
constitutes a source of international obligation for the United States and 
other OAS Member States that are not parties to the American 
Convention on Human Rights.”). 
31. Memorandum of Janet Napolitano, supra note 1. 
32. Memorandum of Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 4.   
33. The Unconstitutionality of Obama’s Executive Actions on Immigration, 
Hearing Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 8, at 3. 
34. Daniel Kanstroom, Two Misunderstandings About Immigration, GEO. 
MASON UNIVERSITY’S HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (Nov. 12, 2007), 
available at http://hnn.us/articles/44095.html 
[https://perma.cc/C6NM-R6Q9]. 
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to permit the United States to inject respect for the rule of law into 
an otherwise rigid immigration system. 
 
